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I have struggled to find a way to review James Miller’s Examined Lives: From Socrates to Niet-
zsche, and because of that struggle and the personal reasons associated with it, this will not be 
a typical academic review. 
There is no doubt that Examined Lives is an engaging and concisely written biographical 
account of famous philosophers, whose biographies are in turn well-known by those with a 
classical education. The academic merit of the work is manifest from the opening pages.  
James Miller says his motivation for this biographical collection is that philosophy has become 
“a purely technical discipline, revolving around specialised issues in semantics and logic.” (6)  
There is, according to James Miller, “a principled disregard” (7) for the personal and the lived 
lives of philosophers and “It is generally assumed that ‘philosophy’ refers to the ‘study of the 
most general and abstract features of the world and the categories with which we think: mind, 
matter, reasons, proof, truth etc.,’ to quote the definition offered by the outstanding recent Ox-
ford Dictionary of Philosophy.” (6) 
James Miller emphasizes the personal element and takes a position on one side of what 
has become a methodological schism in the humanities.  That divide is found along the sub-
jective/objective fault line between the engaged specific intellectual—to use the Foucauldian 
term—who finds a way to understanding through subjectively situating themselves in rela-
tionship with the lives of others, and those who feign disinterest and objectivism and who be-
lieve they can a priori stand outside of power-relations, counting the numbers, analyzing the 
social texts and pointing to the disembodied facts without becoming morally obligated to the 
lives of people as they are lived.  
I have argued—in other places—that philosophy approached with a principled dis-
regard, speaks to the intellectual hubris of people who try to put themselves above the normal 
affairs (power-relations) of the great mass of ordinary people who are living extraordinary 
lives in their own ways.  So, I was sympathetic to James Miller’s project from the start. Being 
immersed as I am in my discipline of applied and practical ethics as it is lead by Peter Singer, 
the author of Animal Liberation, I thought that philosophy had, for the most part, moved away 
from a principled disregard of the personal.  Perhaps, however, I am not as in touch with the 
state of the academy as I thought.  For cloistered as I am from what people in my situation call 
‘the real world’ and focused on my intellectual pursuits, which are always grounded in con-
sideration of the kind of person that I have been, who I am now, and who I would like to be-
Minogue: review of Examined Lives 
184 
 
come, then perhaps I have missed the desiccated definition of philosophy from the recent Ox-
ford Dictionary of Philosophy.  At first I thought the competing perspectives of an engaged spe-
cific intellectual and a disinterested objective intellectual would play an important part, but 
having highlighted the competing intellectual perspectives and his bias, James Miller takes a 
side and immerses the reader in the lives so the personal details thereof do the work they are 
intended.  
Having experienced a poor outcome from my formal education, at 23 years of age I 
picked up Bertrand Russell’s History of Western Philosophy in search of answers for why I had 
driven my life to a crisis point.  Reading James Miller’s Examined Lives has reminded me of 
why I undertook a study of philosophy, what I found in Bertrand Russell’s History, and why I 
have achieved, against the odds in this day and age, a classical liberal arts education.  It was to 
arrive at an understanding of Self through the lives of others.  
The wider project of James Miller’s book is to bring back into the view of a con-
temporary philosophical education, the rich tradition among the classical philosophers. This is 
what he calls the “primary point”; an exploration of “the kind of person, the sort of self that 
one could elaborate as a result of taking the quest for wisdom seriously.” (7)  James Miller 
makes the point for the importance of a life lived and an understanding of the philosophical 
canon, which can inform “a choice of life” rather than the forming of “existential opinion.”  (7) 
James Miller presents the lives so very well and so concisely that any attempt by me to further 
summarize his work would do him and this excellent book a great disservice. 
Examined Lives is aimed at animating the personal power of philosophy.  So, rather than 
review the book, I believe it will be far more insightful to talk about its impact on me, as it 
struck an ontological sore spot.  I started to read Examined Lives just when I was faced with a 
very important choice in my life: should I resist the wishes of my University, who held my 
academic future in its hands, or should I acquiesce and have an assured future.  In other 
words, would I choose virtue or pragmatism?  Would I follow the example of Socrates’ virtu-
ous life, or Plato’s pragmatic life?  James Miller’s treatment of the first two philosophers 
brought the ontological, moral and philosophical issues into stark personal focus and hence 
the relevance of the lives depicted was very well illustrated for me.  Even though I know the 
biographies well, having them presented and reading about them at that very moment in my 
life, helped me greatly.  
So, how did the choice between virtue and pragmatism and my academic future come 
about? Working in the modality of a Foucauldian genealogical analysis, my PhD research un-
covered a hitherto unidentified pervasive praxis of punishment by private agents of punish-
ment who commit the most extreme acts of torture and murder in Australia.  In my thesis, I 
detail the emergence of a sense of Self and Other through a sovereign, and then a disciplinary 
power to punish.  I argue that a carceral understanding of Self is maintained by the norms of 
and resistance to, disciplinary power as it is described in Discipline and Punish.  I trace a nor-
mative discourse surrounding punishment, which shapes the emergence of this carceral un-
derstanding of a good Self which is oppositional to a bad Other who is categorised as being 
like an ‘animal.’  I find that the animal analogy of Otherness is a hyper-subjective ready-
reckoner that is widely used to conclude that a bad offending Other is so unlike the normative 
‘us’ of a good Self, that it is morally permissible for that bad Other to be a victim of violence 
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and slaughtered like a nonhuman animal.  I detail how the discursive acts of victims of crime 
advocacy of the law-and-order lobby, Government and law enforcement all contribute to a 
necropolitical discourse, which is manifested as a popular public hate-speech. This discourse 
is then used by delinquents to ethically support the torture and murder of certain vulnerable 
Others who are their victims.  I find that the law-abiding Self as well as the delinquent Self join 
together in the hate-speech and the torturous and murderous violence so as to assert their hy-
per-subjective sovereign-like sense of Self, and to advance their political and personal agen-
das.  
In one case study I drew on the hate-speech of a leader of a law-and-order and victim’s 
lobby and then made a moral judgment against his unethical conduct.  That I would make a 
moral judgment against a public figure was seen as highly controversial.  I proved the case for 
the necropolitical discourse to such an extent that the University was concerned that if my re-
search were to become public it would pose a risk to my physical safety.  I should also say that 
I did not employ a lot of subtlety in reporting the findings of my research.  I did not feign dis-
interest and objectivism; I did not claim to be standing outside of the power-relations I was 
exposing.  I took a moral stand as an engaged specific intellectual who is situated within the 
field. Michel Foucault said that the genealogical method “demands relentless erudition… from 
a vast accumulation of source material” to demonstrate the depth of the impact of the power-
relations, which are being examined.  That is just what I did as I hammered home dozens and 
dozens of examples of the necropolitical discourse of the law-and-order lobby, Government, 
law enforcement and the accompanying violence and public disorder by delinquents.  Added 
to the controversy of these findings is the fact that I am a long-term, high-profile prisoner in 
Australia. 
I had passed the examination processes. However, because of the controversial nature 
of my findings and the moral judgments against public figures; because I had proved a case 
for an immoral necropolitical discourse; because I did not feign a disinterred objectivism; be-
cause there was considered to be a risk to my personal safety if my findings became known; 
and because of my status as a high profile prisoner, the University said that before it would 
award the degree it would need to consider if public access to my research should be re-
stricted. 
So, how would I respond to the University wanting to suppress the findings of my re-
search by not making the thesis, or even the award of my degree, public?  The lives in James 
Miller’s work illustrated my very practical dilemma.  I could take the virtuous personal and 
political position of Socrates if I was to oppose the suppression of my research, but we know 
what happened to him; or I could try to negotiate a compromise, but I could well end up like 
Plato after his failed pandering to the political power of tyrants and his final retreat from Syra-
cuse with his tail between his legs.  Perhaps I could look to the personal and political pragma-
tism of Aristotle if I acquiesced to the suppression of my research.  Aristotle’s is a safe path, 
but his life is seen as one characterized by logic and not the virtue of Socrates.  Why not say: to 
hell with it all, and take the hypocritical personal and political position of Seneca and just get 
what I can for myself under the circumstances, but Seneca did not do so well in the end either.  
Most of my friends and colleagues were advising that I should just get the bit of paper and not 
fight with the University before the award.  
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Since my first reading of Bertrand Russell’s idiosyncratic History of Western Philosophy 
to my readings of James Miller’s Examined Lives, Socrates has been ‘the’ philosopher for me.  
So with the University yet to formalize my award, I opposed what I called their suppression of 
my research and I made an uncompromising argument for my academic freedom and for 
courage and action in the face of the dominant necropolitical discourse.  I argued that my the-
sis should be made public by the University on its library website, like all other PhD theses. I 
pointed out that the risk was mine to take and that I had made nothing but fair comments 
about matters which were all on the public record.  I waited, but heard nothing until the Uni-
versity awarded my PhD and then a month later I was told that my research would not be 
publicly available for a period of five years, at which time its status would be reviewed.  I was 
advised my award would be publically announced in the normal way. 
The point of this personal aside has been to demonstrate that philosophy and learning 
has an active role in the lives we live and it is not just the study of the most general and ab-
stract features of the world, or of mind, matter, reason, and proof.  James Miller’s Examined 
Lives provides that which is fundamental to our understanding of ourselves and our present, 
the example of the lives of others from which we can learn.  Examined Lives came to me at just 
the right time and the examples illustrated by the lives helped me find my way and make a 
moral choice about how I should behave; there can be no greater recommendation for any 
book.  
 
Postscript: After submitting this review, the prison has acted to suppress my PhD research as 
they will not allow me to send it to a publisher.  Despite all the factual information being 
drawn from the official public record and from published reports in the news media, my nar-
rative and moral judgment against the necropolitical discourse, is thought by the prison to be 
so controversial that it would cause a threat to the security and good order of the prison and 
the safety of prisoners, including myself, if it were to become widely known.  The University 
was concerned about a violent reaction from the public, political branches of government, law 
enforcement and community leaders so they suppressed my research; the prison is also con-
cerned about a violent reaction from prisoners, which is given as another reason for suppress-
ing my research.  These circumstances say to me that everyone is heavily invested in the ne-
cropolitical discourse that there are certain bad Others who should be tortured and murdered 
so as to shore-up a sense of their good Self.  Such is the nature of this ontological investment 
that it is thought by the prison that my analysis exposing the naked immoral and logical in-
consistency of the investment in annihilating the Other would cause acts of violence.  The 
situation I found myself in with the University was essentially a moral choice, but the prison 
has, in my view, quite explicitly threatened my safety in the context of a violent environment 
where people are murdered—perhaps I need to reexamine Plato’s pragmatism in pandering to 
tyrants after all, perhaps.  
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